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ABSTRACT 
Considerable research has been devoted to examining the factors that influence post-acquisition 
performance. Yet, the empirical evidence remains inconclusive as to the extent to which these 
factors affect post-acquisition performance. Building on the theory of relative standing, we 
propose turnover of acquired firm CEO and top management team (TMT) as an important 
mechanism through which commonly examined firm and deal characteristics influence post-
acquisition performance. Specifically, the examined antecedents represent conditions that create 
perceptions of diminished relative standing among acquired firm executives post-acquisition. 
First, we conduct a meta-analysis to quantitatively synthesize existing empirical research on the 
effect of the specified antecedents on executive turnover and on post-acquisition performance. 
Then, we combine meta-analysis with structural equation modeling to examine the links between 
four antecedents, executive turnover, and post-acquisition performance in a mediation model. 
Meta-analytic results (based on 114 studies and 399 effect sizes) reveal that the most significant 
factors affecting post-acquisition performance are executive turnover and the level of integration 
of the acquired firm. However, TMT and CEO turnover have opposite effects on post-acquisition 
performance. Our results also show that sample and measurement characteristics of primary 
studies moderate the identified relations. As expected, we find that CEO and TMT turnover 
mediate relations between three of the four examined antecedents and post-acquisition 
performance. We discuss theoretical contributions and provide directions for future research. 
 
Keywords: executive turnover, mergers and acquisitions, post-acquisition performance, meta-
analysis, structural equation modeling 
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“High turnover after an acquisition is more than just a symptom of organizational 
problems – it may be an important cause” (Krug, 2003: 15). 
Acquisitions are a popular strategy used to achieve corporate growth and diversification, 
and enhance profitability through the realization of synergies; however, the majority of 
acquisitions fail to create value (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). The conditions under 
which acquisitions create value remains a burning question in the strategic management literature 
(Kim & Finkelstein, 2009). In their search for answers, scholars have examined the effects of a 
large variety of micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Kim & 
Finkelstein, 2009). Nevertheless, the empirical evidence has been inconclusive as to whether the 
identified antecedents influence acquisition performance (King et al., 2004). The complexity of 
these relations may be the underlying reason for such results. It may also be the case that 
antecedents do not affect post-acquisition performance directly; rather, they may motivate 
strategic changes in the management cadre of acquired firms that, in turn, influence performance.  
Indeed, past empirical evidence shows higher than average turnover rates among 
executives of acquired firms (Krug, Wright, & Kroll, 2014; Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 
1999). Approximately one-quarter of the acquired firm’s top executives leaves within the first 
year of an acquisition’s completion (Krug, 2009). Another 15% can be expected to leave in the 
second year, and nearly 60% of top executives are lost within five years (Krug et al., 2014). It is 
commonly believed that turnover of acquired firm executives has negative implications for post-
acquisition performance (Krug et al., 2014); however, this consensus may not necessarily be 
correct. As Krug (2009) notes, the relation between turnover of acquired executives and post-
acquisition performance is a complex one, and opposing arguments for its direction exist. From 
an agency theory perspective, executive turnover is desirable because acquisitions are used to 
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discipline inefficient executives (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). On the contrary, the resource-based 
view (RBV) suggests that the loss of top executives is detrimental to post-acquisition success, for 
they possess valuable firm-specific knowledge and capabilities (Barney, 1988) that are critical to 
making acquisitions work (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Given these conflicting arguments, the 
reasons for replacing or retaining acquired executives may advance our understanding of 
acquisition performance and challenge the current consensus (Krug et al., 2014).  
The aim of this study is to discover whether executive turnover following acquisitions is 
a mechanism through which antecedents influence post-acquisition performance. We focus on 
two firm characteristics (i.e., acquiring firm’s acquisition experience and acquired firm pre-
acquisition performance), and two deal characteristics (i.e., relative firm size and the extent to 
which the acquired firm’s autonomy is removed) that represent conditions likely to create 
perceptions of low relative standing of acquired firm executives. First, we conduct a meta-
analysis to quantitatively synthesize existing empirical research on the effect of the specified 
antecedents on executive turnover and post-acquisition performance. Then, we combine meta-
analysis with structural equation modeling (MASEM) to determine whether executive turnover 
mediates the relations between the identified factors and post-acquisition performance.  
In addressing these issues, we make four contributions to the literature. First, we 
contribute to acquisition research by cumulating the findings of published and unpublished 
research on the effects of commonly examined firm and deal characteristics on executive 
turnover and post-acquisition performance. The examined antecedents contribute to our 
understanding of executive turnover following acquisitions and how, in turn, such turnover 
affects post-acquisition performance. Specifically, these antecedents represent conditions that are 
likely to provoke perceptions of diminished relative standing among acquired firm executives 
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post-acquisition (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). When executives feel or are seen as inferior, they 
are much more likely to leave or be replaced (Very, Lubatkin, Calori, & Veiga, 1997). The 
results of our analyses provide support for the theory of relative standing as an explanation of 
high turnover rates of acquired executives post-acquisition. Moreover, results of this study shed 
light on the debate surrounding the influence of executive turnover on post-acquisition 
performance. Meta-analysis allows us to provide empirical generalizations for the observed 
relations over distinct disciplines and across a large number of primary studies. By collecting 
data from 114 studies and extracting 399 effect sizes, our findings provide evidence of the 
relative influence of each antecedent on executive turnover and post-acquisition performance.  
Second, by using MASEM we address questions difficult to cover in any single study 
(Bergh et al., 2014; Landis, 2013). A significant amount of research has been dedicated to 
examining the direct influence of various antecedents on post-acquisition performance (Datta, 
Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King et al., 2004). This is the first study, to the best of our 
knowledge, to propose and show executive turnover as a mediating mechanism in the 
antecedents–post-acquisition performance relations.  
Third, we conduct parallel studies of CEO and TMT turnover to determine whether 
differences exist across studies in antecedents and consequences of these two types of executive 
turnover. In doing so, we accumulate evidence from distinct streams of research that have 
developed along separate lines. While the finance literature has focused on CEO turnover, the 
management literature has emphasized the role of top management team (TMT) turnover largely 
influenced by upper echelons theory, which acknowledges the key role of the TMT in setting the 
firm’s strategic direction (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Our study provides evidence that the two 
streams of research are interrelated and can benefit from further integration. Specifically, our 
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results show that TMT turnover negatively affects post-acquisition performance; conversely, the 
effect of CEO turnover appears to be positive. Future research should examine the similarities 
and differences between these types of executive turnover and their role in acquisition success.  
Fourth, meta-analysis allows us to identify significant moderating effects of sample and 
measurement characteristics of primary studies. In this way, our findings help explain 
inconsistent empirical evidence in the literature about the relations under study. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Despite the growing popularity of acquisitions in business practice, research to date has 
provided evidence that the majority of acquisitions fail to create value (King et al., 2004). 
Acquisitions are complex events, and low post-acquisition performance has been attributed to a 
variety of micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; King et al., 
2004; Kroll, Wright, Toombs, & Leavell, 1997; Lubatkin, Narasimhan, & Merchant, 1997; 
Walker, 2000). Recently, there has been growing interest in the influence of acquired firms’ 
executive turnover on acquisition success (Krug et al., 2014). This interest in executives is not 
surprising because “if we want to explain why organizations do the things they do, or, in turn, 
why they perform the way they do, we must examine the people at the top” (Hambrick, 1989: 5). 
Summarizing prior research, Mackey (2008) points out the important role of top executives in 
formulating a collective purpose for members of the organization, shaping organizational culture 
and infusing it with values, as well as directing the organization’s course through times of 
uncertainty and change. The upper echelons’ perspective views strategic choices and ultimately, 
the performance consequences of these choices, as reflections of the unique values, 
characteristics, and experiences of top managers. In addition, their intimate knowledge of the 
organization and its stakeholders makes them a difficult to replace resource (Kiessling, Harvey, 
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& Heames, 2008). Given their essential role in the organization, executives’ departure is likely to 
have a substantial impact on a firm’s performance (Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992).  
Employee turnover and its implications for performance have been widely studied in the 
human resource management (HRM) literature, and collective turnover at the group-, unit-, and 
organization-level is attracting increasing theoretical and empirical research attention (Hancock, 
Allen, Bosco, Pierce, & McDaniel, 2013; Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011). Summarizing prior 
findings, Hausknecht and Trevor state that “[c]ollective turnover can lead to undesirable 
outcomes because it entails the loss of firm-specific human and social capital, disrupts operations 
and collective function, saddles remaining members with newcomer socialization and training, 
and increases recruitment and selection costs” (2011: 360). Thus, in addition to CEO turnover, 
we are interested in TMT turnover rate, a type of collective turnover likely to have significant 
consequences for firm performance. It is uncommon for decision-making, especially within large 
organizations, to be concentrated solely in the hands of the CEO (Krug, 2009). Rather, the 
complexity and uncertainty surrounding such organizations necessitate the inclusion of the entire 
TMT in the decision-making process (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). As Finkelstein, Hambrick and 
Cannella point out “studying the consequences of team-level turnover, particularly on 
performance, will allow eventually greater understanding than would be obtained by focusing on 
CEO turnover” (2009: 223) 
Executive Turnover and Post-Acquisition Performance 
Two dominant perspectives have been used to explain the link between executive 
turnover and post-acquisition performance. According to agency theory, acquisitions occur as a 
result of inefficient management of the acquired firm (Manne, 1965). Takeovers are 
conceptualized as external governance mechanisms for punishing ineffective executives, the last 
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resort after internal governance mechanisms have failed. The market for corporate control allows 
for the transfer of managerial control over the acquired firm’s resources to the management of 
the acquiring firm who can reconfigure these resources and extract greater value (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983). Consequently, agency theory argues that executive turnover is desirable, 
suggesting it has a positive effect on post-acquisition performance. This view was predominant 
early in acquisition research (Krug et al., 2014). However, later studies have provided evidence 
that acquisitions are not always a result of inefficient management of the acquired firm, 
providing limited support for agency theory and the theory of the market for corporate control 
(Walsh & Kosnik, 1993). Rather, firms that outperform their competitors may be acquired to 
gain access to valuable resources and capabilities they possess (Davis & Stout, 1992). 
On the basis of this evidence, the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) provides a 
rationale for a negative relation between acquired firm executive turnover and post-acquisition 
performance. RBV states that firms engage in acquisitions to take advantage of potential 
synergies and to acquire, bundle, and leverage valuable, unique, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
resources (Barney, 1988). Thus, executives are viewed as valuable firm resources for they 
possess important firm-specific nontransferable knowledge, capabilities (Bergh, 2001; Jemison 
& Sitkin, 1986), and social capital (Hitt & Ireland, 2002). They are assumed to be difficult to 
replace; their loss is likely to negatively impact post-acquisition performance (Cannella & 
Hambrick, 1993) because newly appointed executives “sometimes lack the experience and 
knowledge that enable them to pick up where departing executives left off” (Krug & Nigh, 2001: 
86). Furthermore, replacing acquired firm executives creates additional challenges in effectively 
integrating the acquired firm (Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997). Acquisitions represent 
disruptive organizational events, and executive departures at times of uncertainty can break 
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needed leadership continuity (Krug, 2003), leading to further distress within the organization and 
affecting its external relations with stakeholders (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993). Acquired 
executives may be replaced with successors from outside the firm; however, human capital 
theory suggests that such a process is likely to prove difficult and costly. Hence, we predict that 
executive departures post-acquisition are responsible for poor organizational performance.  
 There is a negative relation between acquired firm executive turnover 
and post-acquisition performance. 
This discussion provokes two questions: Why do executives of acquired firms leave post-
acquisition? Moreover, do different conditions associated with executive turnover help explain 
when executive turnover is more or less likely to threaten post-acquisition performance? Insights 
regarding the mediating role of executive turnover can provide a better understanding of the 
relations between antecedents and post-acquisition performance.  
We focus on two firm and two deal characteristics: acquired firm pre-acquisition 
performance, acquiring firm acquisition experience, level of integration, and relative firm size. 
We consider these characteristics as indicators of conditions under which acquired firm 
executives are likely to vary in perceptions of relative standing. According to the theory of 
relative standing, individuals compare their status with that of others in a proximate social setting 
(Frank, 1985). The theory predicts that the relative standing of acquired firm executives is based 
on perceptions of status and importance with respect to acquiring firm top managers (Hambrick 
& Cannella, 1993; Lubatkin et al., 1999; Ranft & Lord, 2000), and can help explain dynamics 
that emerge post-acquisition. The arguments of relative standing are particularly applicable in the 
context of acquisitions because “acquired executives are placed in a new social setting in which 
comparisons to their acquirers as well as comparisons to their prior situation are inevitable and 
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salient” (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993: 736). In addition, the concept of relative standing explains 
both voluntary and involuntary departure of acquired executives; acquired executives are likely 
to experience diminished relative standing when acquiring firms’ executives act dominant and 
superior in status (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). Such status degradation and loss of importance 
in the organization can lead to acquired executives choosing to leave or to expressing their 
dissatisfaction with the new social setting through subversive behaviors and suboptimal 
performance that can result in dismissal (Shrivastava, 1986). Prior research provides support for 
the theory of relative standing in the context of acquisitions, and the argument that both 
voluntary and involuntary turnover can be attributed to low relative standing (Hambrick & 
Cannella, 1993). For instance, studies show that lower relative standing is associated with higher 
departure rates of executives following acquisitions, and that lower relative standing results in 
declines in productivity of corporate scientists of acquired firms (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; 
Paruchuri, Nerkar, & Hambrick, 2006; Ranft & Lord, 2000; Very et al., 1997).  
Note that we are not directly measuring executives’ perceptions of relative standing, but 
rather measuring those conditions that may induce perceptions of lower relative standing 
(Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). As prior research has identified all four characteristics as 
antecedents of post-acquisition performance and executive turnover, the theory of relative 
standing allows us to develop further arguments about the role of acquired executive turnover as 
a mechanism through which these characteristics influence post-acquisition performance. 
Firm Characteristics 
Pre-acquisition performance. Research suggests that post-acquisition performance will 
improve following the acquisition of a poorly performing firm (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). A firm 
is motivated to acquire an underperforming firm so that it can improve performance by 
EXECUTIVE TURNOVER META-ANALYSIS 
11 
reconfiguring the acquired firm’s resources and assuming the responsibilities of acquired 
executives (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Manne, 1965). Executive turnover following such 
acquisitions is desirable because executives are viewed as the underlying cause of poor 
performance. Executives whose firms are in financial distress are often blamed for incompetence 
and inability to turn the organization around (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993), 
contributing to perceptions of lower relative standing of acquired executives. Accordingly, when 
acquired firm performance is poor, executives are more likely to be dismissed. Even if 
involuntary turnover does not immediately follow, acquired executives are likely to experience 
lower status and confined discretion that may ultimately lead to departure (Hambrick & 
Cannella, 1993). On the contrary, executives of high performing acquired firms are more likely 
to be viewed as valuable resources that should be retained for their knowledge, skills, and 
valuable social capital. Thus, when acquired firm performance is high, executives are less likely 
to leave because they can maintain discretion and favorable relative standing.  
Poor firm performance is often attributed to CEOs because they occupy a central position 
in the TMT (Daily & Johnson, 1997). Following acquisitions of poorly performing firms, CEOs 
are likely to be dismissed or granted lower levels of discretion. Acquired CEOs with low relative 
standing may choose to depart voluntarily, as they are unwilling to accept a diminished role. 
However, replacing the acquired CEO may be a symbolic (Boeker, 1992) rather than substantial 
step in implementing a turnaround strategy. Acquiring firms may view the replacement of a 
larger proportion of the TMT necessary for a successful turnaround of the acquired firm. In 
addition, TMT turnover may elicit “concerns over security, status, and power” among remaining 
team members (Kesner & Dalton, 1994: 704). Therefore, acquisitions of poorly performing firms 
will be associated with higher collective turnover among TMT members. 
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Although there are practical reasons to replace incumbent executives of acquired firms, 
research has shown that acquirers often face challenges in improving the performance of 
financially distressed firms (Clark & Ofek, 1994). Executive turnover can disrupt operations and 
negatively influence the integration process as existing members of the acquired organization 
may disapprove of or be unwilling to cooperate with the new leadership (Shrivastava, 1986). 
Thus, executive turnover may constitute an important mechanism through which acquired firm 
pre-acquisition performance affects post-acquisition performance.  
 There is a negative relation between acquired firm pre-acquisition 
performance and post-acquisition performance. 
 There is a negative relation between acquired firm pre-acquisition 
performance and acquired firm executive turnover. 
 The relation between pre-acquisition performance and post-acquisition 
performance is partially mediated by executive turnover. 
The above hypotheses suggest that while the direct effect of pre-acquisition performance 
on post-acquisitions performance is negative, its indirect effect mediated by executive turnover is 
positive. Such models are referred to as inconsistent mediation (MacKinnon, Krull, & 
Lockwood, 2000) or competitive mediation (Zhao, Lynch Jr., & Chen, 2010). Zhao and 
colleagues note that such models “point to a theoretically interesting indirect effect” and may 
guide future research in completing the theoretical framework by identifying omitted mediators 
that are inconsistent with the sign of the direct effect (2010: 201). In the following sections, we 
also propose competitive mediation for relations among acquisition experience, level of 
integration, executive turnover, and post-acquisition performance. 
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Acquisition experience. Acquiring firms that have completed prior acquisitions 
accumulate experience that may affect post-acquisition performance. By transferring experience 
from one acquisition event to another, acquirers not only learn how to select suitable acquisition 
targets but also develop integration capabilities that are crucial for acquisition success (Zollo & 
Singh, 2004). Despite its theoretical appeal, the evidence for a positive relation between 
experience and post-acquisition performance is inconclusive (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Some 
studies have found that acquirers who use previously successful practices and routines can 
achieve higher levels of acquisition performance (Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994; Hayward, 
2002). Other studies show evidence of a negative relation, suggesting that transfer of experiences 
may be applied inappropriately because acquisitions can significantly differ from one another, 
rendering the accumulated knowledge inappropriate (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002). Drawing 
on meta-analytic results, King et al. (2004) conclude that there is not a significant relation 
between acquisition experience and post-acquisition performance.  
We argue that acquired firm executive turnover is an important mechanism through 
which acquisition experience influences post-acquisition performance. Inexperienced acquirers 
are more likely to retain executives as they possess valuable firm- and market-specific 
knowledge (Davis & Nair, 2003). On the contrary, acquirers with acquisition experience may be 
confident in their own executives’ capabilities to complete the integration process, thereby 
diminishing the relative standing of acquired firm management in the process. Such confidence 
in the superior capabilities of their own executives may result in involuntary turnover of acquired 
top managers whose capabilities are viewed as redundant. Moreover, when acquiring firms have 
experience with acquisitions, strategic decisions may be imposed on incumbent firm executives 
signaling that they are unimportant in the integration process, thus resulting in their voluntary 
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departure (Krug, 2009; Krug & Nigh, 2001). Particularly, CEOs of acquired firms may perceive 
their human and social capital under-valued in the post-acquisition process when the acquiring 
firm has a history of prior acquisitions.  
Furthermore, firms with acquisition experience may also be more skilled at selecting a 
suitable acquisition target in the first place. Specifically, such acquirers can ensure that they 
possess the necessary human capital to run the acquired firm without input from its incumbent 
TMT members. Therefore, greater overlap among the acquired firm’s executive pool human 
capital with that of the acquirer firm is likely to lead to higher collective turnover in the acquired 
executive team. However, such turnover may negatively influence the integration process. 
Consequently, post-acquisition performance may also be affected because “no two deals are the 
same” (Barkema & Schijven, 2008: 595). Acquired firm executives possess firm-specific 
knowledge, and they can help avoid mindless replication of inappropriate routines to the focal 
acquisition (Ellis, Reus, Lamont, & Ranft, 2011). Hence, we posit that the effect of experience 
on post-acquisition performance may depend on retaining existing top executives.  
 There is a positive relation between acquirer experience and post-
acquisition performance. 
 There is a positive relation between acquirer experience and acquired 
firm executive turnover. 
 The relation between acquisition experience and post-acquisition 
performance is partially mediated by executive turnover. 
Deal Characteristics 
Level of Integration. The extent to which the acquired firm is integrated with the 
“strategy, systems, and procedures” (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993: 742) of the acquirer has 
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important implications for acquired firm executives in terms of their autonomy. Lower levels of 
integration allow acquired executives to retain greater autonomy and discretion in decision-
making, but higher levels of integration necessitate that the acquired firm conforms to the 
policies, practices, and procedures of the acquiring firm (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). Larsson 
and Finkelstein (1999) found empirical support for the argument that the level of integration is 
positively related to post-acquisition performance because interaction and coordination between 
firms are necessary to achieve synergies. Consequently, even if an acquisition’s potential for 
creating synergies is high, lack of sufficient integration will prevent potential synergies from 
being realized (Pablo, 1994). Conversely, integration may produce negative consequences for 
firms involved in the acquisition process. Greater integration of the acquired firm is also 
associated with greater disruption of the routines and practices of the acquired firm (Very et al., 
1997). Post-acquisition integration results in enhanced control of acquiring firm executives over 
the acquired entity; it “reinforces the higher relative standing of the acquiring firm’s executives” 
(Saxton & Dollinger, 2004: 127). Such dynamics have implications for both voluntary and 
involuntary turnover of acquired firm executives.  
Integration may result in the voluntary departure of executives because they lose 
autonomy and discretion. Specifically, integration is associated with acquired CEOs becoming 
dependent on the acquirer to make decisions that were once under their discretion, which makes 
status and power loss salient (Pablo, 1994) and induces perceptions of being dominated 
(Lubatkin et al., 1999). Similar mechanisms are likely to operate within TMTs. TMT members’ 
loss of autonomy as a result of greater post-acquisition integration can affect their propensity to 
depart (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). In parallel, acquiring firms may be motivated to replace 
acquired firm executives or force them to turnover in order to eliminate the cost of having 
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redundant resources. Nevertheless, top executives possess skills and knowledge that make them 
key to the realization of synergies (Schweiger & Very, 2003). Their loss may negatively affect 
post-acquisition performance because acquiring executives do not have knowledge of the 
acquired firm and its organizational culture nor do they “have trusting relationships established 
with their new colleagues and subordinates” (Shrivastava, 1986: 73). Altogether, acquired 
executives may lack the ability to make informed and effective decisions with respect to the 
integration process.  
 There is a positive relation between level of integration and post-
acquisition performance. 
 There is a positive relation between level of integration and acquired 
firm executive turnover. 
 The relation between level of integration and post-acquisition 
performance is partially mediated by executive turnover. 
Relative firm size. Findings regarding the effect on acquisition performance of acquired 
firm relative size to that of the acquirer have been inconsistent (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, 
Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Even though acquiring larger firms offers higher profit potential, it 
may be a challenge in terms of paying for and integrating the acquired firm, constituting a case 
of ‘biting off more than you can chew’ (Kusewitt, 1985). Scanlon, Trifts, and Pettway (1989) 
provided evidence that acquisitions of relatively larger firms result in poor performance. On the 
other hand, Kitching (1967) found that acquisitions of smaller firms are associated with poor 
performance, suggesting that the profit potential from acquisitions of small firms relative to the 
acquirer is too little to make up for the high amount of managerial attention such acquisitions 
require (Kusewitt, 1985). Finally, some studies found no significant association between the two 
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variables (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989). A potential explanation for these inconsistent findings may 
be the failure to account for the association of relative firm size with post-acquisition changes in 
the management cadre of acquired firms, which subsequently affect performance.  
We expect a negative relation between the size of the acquired firm relative to that of the 
acquirer and executive turnover. A larger acquiring firm is more likely to possess the resources 
needed to successfully manage the acquired firm’s operations (Krug, 2009), including human 
capital. A larger and more resourceful acquiring firm may view acquired executives as less 
important to the success of the acquisition and thus as having lower relative standing. Thus, a 
smaller acquired firm relative to the acquirer is likely to experience a higher level of involuntary 
executive turnover. In addition, following an acquisition by a larger entity, executives of the 
acquired firm are likely to experience decreased status, autonomy, and discretion. Such losses 
increase acquired executives’ propensity to feel dominated by the acquirer, and hence, to be 
more likely to depart voluntarily (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993).  
CEO’s of relatively smaller acquired firms, in particular, may be less willing to accept a 
diminished role after serving as the top firm executive as they are used to being a ‘big frog in a 
small pond’ (Frank, 1985). For TMT members of relatively smaller acquired firms, the 
individual influences on departure may be mixed. Some TMT member competencies may be 
more or less redundant with those of the larger acquiring firm. The likelihood of redundancy 
should be greater the larger the acquiring relative to the acquired firm. As a result, acquisitions 
by larger firms may be associated with higher collective turnover among the TMT members.  
Thus, we expect an overall positive relation between the relative size of the acquired to 
acquiring firm and post-acquisition performance, in part because of the lower executive turnover 
we expect when acquired firms are relatively larger. Acquirers may underestimate the amount of 
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managerial attention that acquisitions of smaller firms require, and potential synergies may not 
be realized due to higher executive turnover, which deprives the acquiring firm of valuable firm-
specific knowledge (Bergh, 2001). On the contrary, even though the complexity of managing the 
acquisition and the integration process increases when the acquired firm is relatively larger in 
size (Shrivastava, 1986), in such circumstances, the acquired firm executives are more likely to 
retain higher relative standing because they are less likely to be easily substitutable by acquiring 
firm executives (Walsh, 1989). Thus, we argue that the extent to which acquiring firms realize 
profits from an acquisition depends on retaining acquired firm executives as their departure “is 
likely to threaten the intrinsic value of the integrating firms and prevents the realization of 
synergies and cash flows” (Schweiger & Very, 2003: 15).  
 There is a positive relation between the size of the acquired firm relative 
to the acquiring firm and post-acquisition performance. 
 There is a negative relation between the size of the acquired firm relative 
to the acquiring firm and acquired firm executive turnover. 
 The relation between relative firm size and post-acquisition performance 
is partially mediated by executive turnover. 
METHODS 
Literature Search 
The search process for relevant studies consisted of the following steps. First, we used 
relevant search terms such as turnover, departure, retention, CEO, senior manager, executive, 
top management, TMT, M&A, merger, acquisition, takeover to identify studies concerning CEO 
and TMT turnover in acquired firms. Without a start date, we searched databases, including 
Business Source Premier, ABI/Inform, Web of Science, and JSTOR to identify articles on the 
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topic. Second, we conducted a citation search of identified studies and reviewed articles for 
references to other similar studies examining antecedents of executive turnover following 
acquisitions (e.g., Krug et al., 2014). The goal of the initial search was to identify studies that 
examined relations between the four described antecedents of acquired firm executive turnover. 
Nevertheless, we collected all studies that examined executive turnover relations to identify other 
commonly examined antecedents that can later be included as control variables in the SEM 
analysis. After completing the initial process and identifying the most frequently examined 
antecedents of acquired firm executive turnover, the third step consisted of collecting studies 
relevant to the identified antecedents and post-acquisition performance. Following the process 
identified above, we used relevant search terms such as merger, acquisition, performance, 
integration, relative size, and experience. As a fourth step, we sought to address the ‘file drawer 
problem’. We performed searches with Google Scholar and posted calls on the Academy of 
Management and Academy of International Business list serves to identify unpublished work-in-
progress and dissertation studies. We also contacted authors of studies that examined executive 
turnover but no usable statistics were reported for purposes of our analysis.  
Inclusion Criteria 
After completion of our broad initial search, we accumulated over 4,000 potential studies. 
The search results were entered into a reference management program (Zotero 4.0) to identify 
and eliminate duplicate entries. The criteria for inclusion of acquisition-related empirical studies 
in our meta-analysis had a number of rules. First, studies had to examine a relation of 
antecedents with either executive turnover or post-acquisition performance. Second, studies of 
TMT turnover needed to examine a relation of unit- or organizational-level collective executive 
turnover with at least one of the identified antecedents or post-acquisition performance. Third, 
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similarly, primary studies of CEO turnover had to assess a relation of individual-level turnover 
with at least one of the identified antecedents or post-acquisition performance. We excluded 
studies that were not empirical; that only provided cumulative percentages of executive turnover; 
and that did not include a correlation matrix, report bivariate relation between variables of 
interest, or offer data that could be used to calculate an effect size estimate (e.g., those providing 
univariate percentages, or proportions of means without standard deviations).  
After inclusion and exclusion criteria restrictions, the final set of studies included in the 
analysis consisted of 114 manuscripts examining relations among antecedents, executive 
turnover, and post-acquisition performance. A total of 101 published studies (1987– 2015) 
included 99 journal articles and three book chapters, whereas 11 unpublished manuscripts 
consisted of two conference papers, six working papers, and three doctoral dissertations. A full 
list of studies from which correlations were extracted and the number of studies per publication 
outlet is available in the online supplemental material.  
Coding Procedures 
We followed Lipsey and Wilson’s (2001) procedures in developing our database. Two of 
the authors jointly coded all effect sizes from each of the identified studies. First, we prepared a 
coding protocol, which identified the information to be extracted from each study. A majority of 
the identified studies utilized regression analyses providing correlation coefficients (r), which we 
collected along with sample sizes among all the variables. For studies for which we obtained an 
F-statistic or a t-statistic along with group sample sizes, we computed Cohen’s d effect sizes. 
Consequently, all d effect sizes were converted into r. Finally, where neither an r nor F or t-
statistics were available, we used means and standard deviations to compute an r.  
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We extracted only one effect size per relation from each primary study to maintain 
independence (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). For instance, if turnover was measured 
at multiple years following an acquisition, we retained only one effect size. For consistency, we 
retained only effect sizes based on turnover measured within the first three years after the 
acquisition because the majority of effect sizes fell within this period. When primary studies 
used multiple variables to measure a construct (e.g., foreign and domestic acquisition 
experience), we followed Hunter & Schmidt’s (2004) recommendation to compute a composite 
correlation instead of taking a simple average. In addition, we were able to examine different 
measurement approaches as potential moderators of relations of interest. We encountered six 
instances in which two or more studies used overlapping samples. To maintain independence, we 
obtained effect sizes only from the study with the larger sample (Bergh et al., 2014).  
Executive Turnover. We focus on two separate types of executive turnover: individual-
level CEO turnover and organizational-level TMT turnover rate. We operationalized the 
construct as: (a) whether the CEO had left the acquired firm after the acquisition; and (b) the 
proportion of TMT members from the original TMT of the acquired firm who had left post-
acquisition. The TMT typically includes the CEO and all officers at or above the level of Vice 
President who report directly to the CEO (e.g., COO, CFO, CEO, Senior VP, President, 
Chairman, Vice-Chairman) (Bergh, 2001; Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). The formula for TMT 
turnover is equivalent to the instability rate (Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011), where the numerator 
is the number of acquired firm TMT members at the time of the acquisition who leave during the 
period, and the denominator is the total number of TMT members employed with the 
organization at the time of the acquisition. For studies that used CEO or TMT retention rather 
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than turnover, we reversed the sign of the correlation coefficient. An overview of constructs, 
definitions, and examples of measures are available in the online supplement.  
Meta-Analytic Procedures 
A total of 67 effect sizes were computed for the antecedents–executive turnover relations 
(i.e., 44 for TMT and 23 for CEO), and 13 for the executive turnover–post-acquisition 
performance relations. In addition, 319 effect sizes for the relations among antecedents and post-
acquisition performance were extracted from a final sample of 60,344 acquisitions. We followed 
Hunter and Schmidt’s (2004) guidelines for meta-analysis. We include a sample size-weighted 
mean (r), which provides greater weight to effect sizes obtained from larger samples. We also 
report the number of studies (k) and the cumulative sample size (N), along with the correlations 
after correcting for unreliability (ρ). Although a majority of the variables of interest were 
observed, these corrections were estimated using a more conservative .80 value on all effect sizes 
for which reliability was not reported (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). We report 
95% confidence intervals around the mean effect size to detect significance (Whitener, 1990). 
Moderator variable analyses. One benefit of meta-analysis is the ability to identify and 
test potential moderating effects of characteristics of original studies (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). 
This approach allows us to determine whether differences in effect sizes exist across studies by 
establishing subgroups and conducting separate meta-analyses for each subgroup. When the 
variability in effect sizes for a particular relation is greater than what is expected due to sampling 
error, a moderation analysis can provide additional insights as to why correlation coefficients 
vary across samples (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We searched for potential moderating effects for 
relations in which sampling error accounted for less than 75% of the observed variance in effect 
sizes (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). We also examined the I2 statistic, an index associated with the 
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degree of heterogeneity (i.e., I2 > 75% indicates high heterogeneity) (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, 
& Altman, 2003). In addition, we inspected 80% credibility intervals, which, unlike confidence 
intervals, do not assume a single population estimate, and an interval that is either sufficiently 
large or includes zero may indicate the presence of multiple subgroups (Whitener, 1990).  
First, we checked whether variance in effect sizes existed across samples that include 
acquisitions occurring in different time periods (e.g., the '80s vs. '90s). We expected executives 
of acquired firms in the '80s to be more likely to turnover, which in turn negatively affects post-
acquisition performance. Acquisitions during the takeover wave of the '80s “were a move of 
consolidation and specialization” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991: 54) and were more likely to be 
hostile and to involve subsequent sales of a large proportion of the acquired firm’s assets. We 
also examined differences in effect sizes across studies that used primary versus secondary 
turnover data. We expected the estimated effect to be stronger for studies that rely on primary 
sources of turnover data. Secondary data is commonly utilized in measuring turnover; annual 
reports and/or reference books are more likely to lack precise records or have missing data, 
which can result in smaller cumulative turnover rates.  
We examined whether differences in effect sizes exist based on how performance was 
measured (e.g., accounting vs. market measures, perceptual vs. non-perceptual measures). The 
acquisition performance construct is “multifaceted, comprised of numerous dimensions that are 
relatively unrelated” (Cording, Christmann, & Weigelt, 2010: 13) and is often operationalized 
using several different measures. For instance, some studies relied on stock market-based 
measures of performance (e.g., CAR; Tobin’s q); others utilized accounting- (e.g., ROA, ROE) 
or survey-based measures. To avoid reporting biases when using subjective measures, 
researchers have suggested that combining subjective measures (i.e., based on perceptions of 
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executives and/or industry experts in M&A transactions) with objective measures of post-
acquisition performance can enhance understanding (Das & Kapil, 2012), and that these two 
types of measures are positively correlated (Zollo & Meier, 2008). We also examined whether 
differences in effect sizes exist with respect to the time horizon used when measuring post-
acquisition performance (i.e., whether performance was measured within two years or more than 
two years following the acquisition announcement). Prior research suggests that the lack of 
consensus on when to measure acquisition performance results in inconsistent findings regarding 
the effects of acquisition experience on post-acquisition performance (Cording et al., 2010). 
Because acquisitions constitute the combination of two firms, we also considered whether 
reported post-acquisition performance was that of the acquiring, acquired or combined firm. 
Researchers justify the use of the acquiring firm’s consolidated performance post-acquisition 
because it is nevertheless likely to reflect the performance of the acquired firm (Bergh, 2001). 
On the other hand, data on post-acquisition performance of the acquired firm are often 
impossible to obtain since it is common that the firm is fully integrated into the acquiring firm, 
ceasing to exist as a standalone entity (Zollo & Singh, 2004). Finally, because strategic 
management scholars have also utilized various measures of firm size, we examined differences 
in effect sizes based on measures of relative firm size (i.e., assets-, sales-, employees- or market 
value-based measures). Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia (2000) performed factor analysis 
on 16 different firm size variables to reveal the underlying structure of the construct. Their 
findings confirm that market value, assets, stock equity, sales, and number of employees all 
measure the same construct (i.e., absolute firm size) and exhibit high internal consistency.  
Addressing publication bias and outliers. We plotted studies based on the effect size 
and sample size. Visual examination of the plot and the Egger test allowed us to detect any 
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significant asymmetry (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997). We also calculated the 
sample-adjusted meta-analytic deviancy (SAMD) statistic for each correlation (Huffcutt & 
Arthur, 1995), used to identify outliers based on sample size. We selected a cutoff value, such 
that studies with SAMD statistic greater than 3 constituted potential outliers. Consequently, we 
performed all meta-analytic and MASEM analyses with and without the studies identified as 
outliers. The results are substantively unchanged if we exclude the outlier studies. Accordingly, 
we proceed with the analyses using the full sample. 
Meta-Analytic Structural Equation Modeling 
The results of the meta-analysis were arranged into a correlation matrix and used for the 
SEM analyses. We performed separate analyses for each turnover type because our sample did 
not include studies that examined CEO and TMT turnover simultaneously. To control for the 
potential confounding effect of industry relatedness (extent of process and product similarity 
between acquired and acquiring firms) on executive turnover and post-acquisition performance, 
we included this variable in our analysis (k = 12). Specifically, the relatedness of acquiring and 
acquired firms has been shown to positively affect performance (Rumelt, 1974), since acquiring 
firm management possesses the required knowledge and skills to operate successfully in the 
acquired firm’s industry. In related acquisitions, the knowledge and skills possessed by 
executives in the two firms are likely to be complementary. Hence, acquired firm executive 
departure in such acquisitions is assumed to be less harmful, as these executives can be easily 
replaced (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993). On the contrary, in unrelated acquisitions, the acquirer 
needs to learn how to operate in a new line of business; as a result, executives are more likely to 
be retained post-acquisition because of their valuable tacit knowledge and familiarity with the 
business and its environment (Walsh, 1988). We were unable to include other control variables 
EXECUTIVE TURNOVER META-ANALYSIS 
26 
in the SEM model due to the lack of a sufficient number of effect sizes for the relations between 
a specific antecedent and all other variables in the correlation matrix (i.e., a minimum of k = 2) 
which would result in missing cells in the correlation matrix (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995).  
We addressed the issue of using different sample sizes to compute each meta-analytically 
derived correlation by calculating a harmonic mean (N = 1,862 for the model including TMT 
turnover and N = 1,840 for CEO turnover). The harmonic mean is a more conservative estimate 
than the arithmetic mean and balances the influence given to large values relative to smaller 
values (Landis, 2013; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). We used the maximum likelihood estimation 
approach and conducted the analyses in R using the lavaan package (Rossel, 2012).  
RESULTS 
Meta-Analytic Results 
Post-acquisition performance. As reported in Table 1, results of the meta-analysis show 
significant effects of both TMT and CEO turnover on post-acquisition performance (i.e., 95% 
confidence interval does not include zero). However, the direction of the relation differs for each 
type of executive turnover. Specifically, consistent with Hypothesis 1, our results suggest a 
negative association between TMT turnover and post-acquisition performance (ρ = −.17, k = 11, 
CI95 = [−.24, −.04]). On the contrary, we find a positive association between CEO turnover and 
post-acquisition performance (ρ = .13, k = 2, CI95 = [.05, .16]). Results show significant effects 
of two of the four antecedents on post-acquisition performance. In support of Hypothesis 8, we 
found that higher level of integration is associated with higher post-acquisition performance (ρ= 
.12, k = 13, CI95 = [.00, .19]). In support of Hypothesis 11, we found that the larger the acquired 
firm in relation to the acquirer, the higher the post-acquisition performance (ρ= .07, k = 35, CI95 
= [.01, .11]). The average correlations of pre-acquisition performance and acquisition experience 
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with post-acquisition performance are small and non-significant (ranging between ρ= −.01 and 
ρ= .01), providing no support for Hypotheses 2 and 5. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
Executive turnover. Table 2 reports our meta-analytic estimates for the relations of 
antecedents with TMT turnover and CEO turnover, respectively. Two antecedents are 
significantly related to both TMT and CEO turnover. Pre-acquisition performance is negatively 
related to TMT turnover (ρ = −.24, k = 9, CI95 = [−.30, −.10]) and to CEO turnover (ρ= −.09, k = 
9, CI95 = [−.13, −.02]), providing support for Hypothesis 3; and level of integration is positively 
related to TMT turnover (ρ = .33, k = 6, CI95 = [.09, .48]) and CEO turnover (ρ= .32, k = 2, CI95 
= [.14, .38]), in support of Hypothesis 9. We found no support for Hypotheses 6 and 12 
regarding the effects of acquisition experience and relative firm size on turnover. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
Moderator Variable Analyses 
Because heterogeneity was present for the majority of the estimated effect sizes, we 
conducted moderation analyses for the seven a priori specified moderator variables. We used 
Hunter and Schmidt’s chi-square test of heterogeneity (Qb) statistic to test whether significant 
differences exist based on levels of a moderator. Only the significant moderation effects are 
reported in Tables 1 and 2. Below we discuss some of the most noteworthy findings. 
Sample period. Effect sizes for the relations between TMT turnover and post-acquisition 
performance (ρ = −.22, k = 5, CI95 = [−.32, −.04]) and between pre- and post-acquisition 
performance (ρ = .25, k = 4, CI95 = [−.02, .42]) are stronger for acquisitions that occurred in the 
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mid-'80s to mid-'90s period, than for those that occurred in the mid-'90s to late '00s (ρ = −.06, k 
= 5, CI95 = [−.17, .07] and ρ = .05, k = 4, CI95 = [− .20, .29]). Similarly, the relation between pre-
acquisition performance and TMT turnover is stronger when acquisitions were announced in the 
period between the mid-'70s and mid-'90s (ρ = −.30, k = 3, CI95 = [−.36, −.12]) than between the 
mid-'90s and late '00s (ρ = −.07, k = 4, CI95 = [−.10, −.01]).  
Turnover data source. For the relation of pre-acquisition performance and TMT 
turnover, we found stronger effect sizes when primary turnover data were used (ρ = −.36, k = 5, 
CI95 [−.40, −.20] than when secondary data were examined (ρ = −.08, k = 3, CI95 [−.13, .01]).  
Time of measurement. The relation between acquisition experience and post-acquisition 
performance is positive when performance was measured more than 2 years after acquisition 
announcement (ρ = .10, k = 7, CI95 = [.01, .15]) and negative when measured less than 2 years 
after announcement (ρ = −.04, k = 24, CI95 = [−.05, −.00]).  
Perceptual vs. non-perceptual measures. The relation between pre- and post-
acquisition performance is more positive when perceptual measures of pre- (ρ = .12, k = 4, CI95 = 
[−.07, .27]) and post-acquisition performance (ρ = .28, k = 4, CI95 = [17, .32]) were used than 
when non-perceptual measures were used; for pre-acquisition (ρ = .00, k = 8, CI95 = [–.09, .09] 
and post-acquisition (ρ = −.02, k = 8, CI95 = [−.10, .07]). The effect size for the pre-acquisition 
performance-TMT turnover relation is also stronger with perceptual measures of performance (ρ 
= −.37, k = 4, CI95 = [−.42, −.18]) than otherwise (ρ = −.10, k = 5, CI95 = [−.15, −.01]). 
Post-acquisition performance entity. The relation between TMT turnover and post-
acquisition performance is strongest when post-acquisition performance was measured as that of 
the acquired firm (ρ = −.37, k = 2, CI95 = [−.39, −.20]), moderately strong when it was measured 
as that of the combined firm (ρ = −.26, k = 4, CI95 = [−.40, −.01]), and weakest when it was 
EXECUTIVE TURNOVER META-ANALYSIS 
29 
measured as the performance of the acquiring firm (ρ = −.09, k = 5, CI95 = [−.19, .04]). Another 
interesting finding is that the relation between pre- and post-acquisition performance is positive 
when post-acquisition performance was measured as the performance of the acquired firm (ρ = 
.38, k = 2, CI95 = [.23, .38]) or the combined firm (ρ = .10, k = 6, CI95 = [−.02, .17]), but negative 
when measured as the performance of the acquiring firm (ρ = −.12, k = 4, CI95 = [−.15, −.04]). 
Performance measure type. Results indicate that the relation between pre-acquisition 
performance and CEO turnover is stronger when market-based measures of performance were 
used (ρ = −.18, k = 5, CI95 = [−.25, −.04]) than when accounting-based measures were used (ρ = 
−.07, k = 4, CI95 = [−.10, −.01]). 
Relative firm size measure type. Finally, our results indicate that the relation between 
relative firm size and post-acquisition performance is strong and positive when firms’ market 
value was used to measure relative size (ρ = .25, k = 7, CI95 = [.09, .31]), still positive but non-
significant when sales or revenues were used (ρ = .01, k = 11, CI95 = [−.03, .05]), and negative, 
when either assets (ρ = −.06, k = 11, CI95 = [−.07, −.02]) or number of employees were used (ρ = 
−.09, k = 4, CI95 = [−.14, −.01]). 
Meta-Analytic Structural Equation Modeling 
Table 3 presents the average correlations among all variables included in our model 
computed by performing separate meta-analyses for each relation. This correlation matrix was 
used as input for the MASEM analyses. The results of the two MASEM analyses (i.e., for TMT 
and CEO turnover) are presented in detail in Table 4. To determine whether turnover was 
measured before, at, or after the time post-acquisition performance was measured, we examined 
the studies from which we extracted effect sizes for the TMT and CEO turnover - post-
acquisition performance relations. Four of the studies explicitly report assessing executive 
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turnover before post-acquisition performance. Four studies assessed turnover rates and post-
acquisition performance over the same period. Lastly, we are unable to determine at what time 
TMT turnover was measured relative to post-acquisition performance in the remaining studies (k 
= 5) since information on either the time of measurement of turnover, post-acquisition 
performance, or both were not explicitly specified. 
The proposed mediation model was compared to a full mediation model and a correlated 
predictor model. The proposed mediation model includes direct and indirect (i.e., through 
executive turnover) links between all four antecedents and post-acquisition performance. In the 
full mediation model, all antecedents are related to post-acquisition performance only through 
executive turnover. The correlated predictor model is a no-mediation model; all antecedents and 
executive turnover are directly and simultaneously related to post-acquisition performance. We 
control for industry relatedness as a predictor of post-acquisition performance in all models. The 
models can be found in the online supplemental material. After evaluation of the results and 
removal of insignificant paths, we arrived at an alternative mediation model, which includes 
some direct and indirect links between antecedents and post-acquisition performance.  
----------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
----------------------------- 
The models were compared based on four established model fit statistics—chi-square (χ
2), root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), normed fit index (NFI), comparative fit 
index (CFI), and standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR). Acceptable model fit is 
associated with non-significant chi-square, values of NFI and CFI greater than .90, RMSEA less 
than or equal to .08, and an SRMR less than .10 (Kline, 2005). The results revealed a good level 
of fit for both TMT (χ24 = .48, ns, CFI = 1.00, NFI = .99, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .00) and CEO 
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(χ24 = 1.90, ns, CFI = 1.00, NFI = .99, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .01) alternative mediation 
models. Figure 1 depicts the alternative mediation model and coefficients for each relation. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
Because our moderator analysis indicated that differences in effect sizes exist across 
moderator subgroups, we performed separate MASEM analyses for different subgroups based on 
how post-acquisition performance was measured (i.e., post-acquisition performance entity and 
perceptual versus non-perceptual measures of performance). For our TMT sample, we examined 
three different measurement scenarios for post-acquisition performance: performance of the (1) 
acquiring firm, (2) combined post-acquisition firm, and (3) combined post-acquisition firm or the 
acquired firm. We were unable to perform the analyses on a subgroup of studies that considered 
the post-acquisition performance of only the acquired firm because an insufficient number of 
studies were available for all bivariate relations in the correlation matrix. Similarly, for the CEO 
sample we were only able to examine one additional scenario, a subgroup of studies where the 
post-acquisition performance measure is the performance of the acquiring firm or the combined 
post-acquisition firm. The results were not substantively different except for the following.  
In the TMT sample, the relation between pre- and post-acquisition performance is 
significant and negative when post-acquisition performance is measured as the performance of 
the acquiring firm, but significant and positive when performance is measured as either that of 
the combined post-acquisition firm or as that of the combined firm or the acquired firm. The 
effect of relative size on post-acquisition performance is not significant when performance was 
measured as that of the combined post-acquisition firm and as the performance of the combined 
or acquired firm. The effect of acquisition experience is negative and marginally significant 
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when the measure of performance is that of the acquiring firm and positive but not significant 
when it includes the combined post-acquisition firm or the combined and acquired firm. These 
results are similar to Cording et al.’s (2010) who found that the effect of experience differs based 
on the measure of acquisition performance. In the CEO sample, the relation between pre- and 
post-acquisition performance is not significant when measuring post-acquisition performance as 
the performance of the combined or the acquiring firm.  
We also conducted the MASEM with a subsample of studies in which post-acquisition 
performance was measured using only perceptual measures. Results remained unchanged except 
for the following observations: the effect of relative size on post-acquisition performance is not 
significant, and there is a significant positive relation between pre- and post-acquisition 
performance. These results are available in the online supplemental material.  
Mediation analysis. In the TMT partial mediation model, the direct effect of pre-
acquisition performance on post-acquisition performance is not significant (β = −.01, ns) and 
100% of its total effect on post-acquisition performance is due to its indirect effect (.05, p < 
.001). These results support a fully mediated relation between pre- and post-acquisition 
performance through TMT turnover, providing partial support for Hypothesis 4. TMT turnover 
partially mediates the relation between acquisition experience and post-acquisition performance, 
providing partial support for Hypothesis 7. The direct effect of experience on performance is 
negative and marginally significant (β = −.04, p < .10). Thus, contrary to expectations, 
acquisitions by firms with greater acquisition experience are likely to perform poorly post-
acquisition. Experience is also negatively associated with TMT turnover (β = −.07, p < .01). The 
indirect effect of acquisition experience on post-acquisition performance through TMT turnover 
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is positive and significant (.02, p < .01). Acquisitions by firms with less experience may perform 
poorly because such acquisitions are likely to result in higher rates of executive turnover.  
In support of Hypotheses 10, we found that both CEO and TMT turnover partially 
mediate the relation between level of integration and post-acquisition performance. For TMT 
turnover, level of integration is positively associated with post-acquisition performance (β = .21, 
p < .001) and TMT turnover (β = .30, p < .001); its indirect effect through TMT turnover is 
negative (−.07, p < .001). This result suggests that greater integration results in higher TMT 
turnover and, in turn, inferior post-acquisition performance. For CEO turnover, level of 
integration is positively associated with post-acquisition performance (β = .10, p < .001) and 
CEO turnover (β = .37, p < .001). Furthermore, the indirect effect of level of integration through 
CEO performance is positive (.04, p < .001). A higher level of integration is associated with 
higher CEO turnover, and such turnover has a positive influence on post-acquisition 
performance. Consequently, CEO turnover helps firms transform the advantages of integration 
into superior post-acquisition performance levels. 
As a robustness check, we used the Monte Carlo Method for Assessing Mediation 
(MCMAM) to assess the statistical significance of our indirect effects by examining the 
generated confidence intervals (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004). We used Selig and 
Preacher’s (2008) interactive tool, and the simulation results with 20,000 repetitions confirm that 
the 95% confidence intervals for all indirect effects reported herein do not include zero. 
DISCUSSION 
The objective of this meta-analysis was to examine the links among four antecedents, 
executive turnover, and post-acquisition performance in a mediation model. With this study, we 
make several contributions to the literature. First, by using meta-analytic techniques we 
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synthesized existing empirical findings and determined the best estimate of the true population 
relations among antecedents, executive turnover, and post-acquisition performance. Also, we 
compared the influence of each antecedent on turnover and post-acquisition performance. In this 
way, our study builds on and extends previous research in this area. Second, by using MASEM 
we were able to test models of the effects of antecedents of CEO and TMT turnover and how in 
turn, each type of turnover influences post-acquisition performance. Specifically, we examined a 
novel research question regarding the role of executive turnover as a mechanism through which 
antecedents affect post-acquisition performance. Our study provides additional support for the 
theory of relative standing in the context of acquisitions. Our results confirm that important 
antecedents of post-acquisition performance may represent conditions that induce perceptions of 
low relative standing in acquired firm executives. Low relative standing can explain high levels 
of executive turnover, which in turn influences post-acquisition performance. 
Third, we integrated findings across two separate streams of research. Specifically, we 
examined two parallel models of turnover of acquired firm executives, one concerning turnover 
of CEOs of acquired firms, and another focused on cumulative turnover rates of TMTs. Our 
results provide evidence that research findings in the finance and management fields are 
interrelated, and greater integration can provide valuable new insights into the relevant role of 
different types of executive turnover in the context of acquisitions. Lastly, our moderator 
analyses provided additional insights into the nature of the examined relations. Specifically, our 
results revealed that several sample and measurement characteristics of primary studies explain 
variability in effect sizes across moderator subgroups.  
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Executive Turnover and Post-Acquisition Performance 
By showing a significant association between executive turnover and firm performance, 
our meta-analysis supports the argument that leaders do matter (Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & 
Gorman, 2005). Specifically, we found a negative association between TMT turnover and post-
acquisition performance, which aligns with recent meta-analysis examining this relation (Butler, 
Perryman, & Ranft, 2012). An acquisition in and of itself constitutes a disruptive event that is 
likely to shake the acquired organization and lead to feelings of great uncertainty for both 
internal organizational members as well as other stakeholders such as customers and suppliers 
(Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Napier, 1989). Given this, turnover of a large portion of the TMT may 
add to the turmoil and uncertainty characterizing the acquired firm post-acquisition (Cannella & 
Hambrick, 1993). TMTs have a ‘boundary-spanning’ role, for they possess valuable social 
capital within (internal networks) and outside the organization (external networks) (Collins & 
Clark, 2003). Furthermore, the loss of valuable knowledge and understanding of the firm can 
impede its successful re-organization and the integration process (Krug et al., 2014). Indeed, a 
delicate balance may exist between change toward adaptation ‘for the better’ and change toward 
disruption ‘for the worse’. This balance may lie in the proportion of TMT lost post-acquisition. 
Substantial changes to the TMT can undermine post-acquisition performance by putting the 
organization into “a state of anxious paralysis” (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993: 141).  
An intriguing result of this study is that, in contrast to the influence of TMT turnover, 
CEO turnover has a positive effect on post-acquisition performance. Because executive turnover 
may be a result of poor firm performance, replacement of the top executive can symbolize much-
needed change, disrupting established practices and norms and positively influencing subsequent 
performance (Grusky, 1963). Executive turnover serves to break organizational inertia and give 
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way to new ideas regarding the firm’s strategic direction (Virany et al., 1992). Furthermore, the 
CEO is the central member of the TMT (Daily & Johnson, 1997) that is ultimately accountable 
and responsible for poor performance (Dalton & Kesner, 1985); thus, he/she is also most likely 
to be replaced under such circumstances. CEO departures may signal a dedication to replace 
inadequate organizational leaders and implement strategic change.  
Our moderator analysis suggests that TMT turnover has a stronger negative effect on 
post-acquisition performance in acquisitions announced in the period between the mid-'80s to 
mid-'90s. Acquisitions in the '80s have been characterized as hostile takeovers that were usually 
“done against the will of the target firm’s management” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991: 53). As a 
result, executives of the acquired firm were more likely to turnover, which in turn negatively 
influenced post-acquisition performance. Our evidence also emphasizes the need to consider 
which entity’s post-acquisition performance is being measured. Although the effect of TMT 
turnover on post-acquisition performance is always negative, we found that turnover affects the 
acquiring firm’s post-acquisition performance less so than it harms the performance of the 
acquired firm or the combined firm’s performance. Future research should examine whether this 
strong negative influence of TMT turnover on post-acquisition performance can be explained by 
the behavioral and emotional reactions of acquired firm employees to the loss of their firms’ 
management team and the changes associated with their replacement. Overall, our results support 
RBV because, on average, the effect of acquired firm TMT turnover on post-acquisition 
performance is negative; its magnitude does vary based on the entity under scrutiny.  
Antecedents and Post-Acquisition Performance 
Although our bivariate results do not suggest a significant relation of pre-acquisition 
performance and acquisition experience with post-acquisition performance, we found several 
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moderators of these relations. For instance, we found that with perceptual measures of post-
acquisition performance, the relation is positive and strong; however, the average effect size was 
approximately zero with non-perceptual measures. A possible explanation may be that acquiring 
firm managers make retrospective errors in an attempt to deny past decisions (Golden, 1992); 
they tend to attribute poor post-acquisition performance to pre-acquisition performance issues of 
the acquired firm rather than to their strategic decisions. Similarly, we found that the effect of 
acquisition experience has a positive influence on performance when performance is measured at 
least two years after acquisition. The relation is weaker and negative, however, when measured 
within the first two years. Integrating the acquired firm is a long and arduous process (Goh, 
2001), and detecting the effects of experience on performance may require a longer period of 
time. Our findings inform future research to consider the timing of measuring post-acquisition 
performance so that the true effect of acquisition experience can be captured.  
We found that deal characteristics have a positive and significant association with post-
acquisition performance. First, as expected, the more integrated the acquired firm is with the 
acquirer post-acquisition, the higher the performance. This finding supports prior research that 
suggests integration of the two firms is necessary to achieve synergies (Larsson & Finkelstein, 
1999; Pablo, 1994). Second, our findings on the effect of relative firm size support the argument 
that on average, acquisitions of small firms are associated with lower performance (Kitching, 
1967). We also found that several factors moderate this relation. For instance, the effect size is 
negligible when sales or revenues are used to calculate firm size, but strong and positive when 
using market value as the measure. We also found a negative average effect size when relative 
size was measured using firm’s assets or number of employees. Overall, our findings suggest that 
the concept of size may be “too global” (Kimberly, 1976: 586). Empirical evidence shows that 
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the examined measures of firm size all measure the same underlying construct; future research 
may need to revisit the conceptual and operational definitions of this construct and why different 
measures have a different influence on post-acquisition performance. 
Antecedents of Executive Turnover Following Acquisitions  
The cumulative evidence suggests that the level of integration is the primary antecedent 
of both CEO and TMT turnover. This finding supports the idea of autonomy in decision making 
as a key indicator of executives’ relative standing (Lubatkin et al., 1999). Higher levels of 
integration are associated with greater need for acquired firm’s executives to comply with 
requirements set by the acquiring firm and demand approval for decisions they used to have the 
discretion to make pre-acquisition (Pablo, 1994). As a result, executives of the acquired firm are 
more likely to depart when they feel dominated by the acquiring firm’s executives who limit 
their latitude of actions. Given the inability to make causal inferences based on meta-analytic 
findings, future qualitative assessments of the level of integration-executive turnover relation 
will be particularly useful in extending our knowledge of how integration decisions influence 
acquired executives’ perceptions and behavior post-acquisition. Furthermore, given the 
ramifications of this antecedent for executive turnover, future research should examine which 
particular integration designs exert the strongest influence on executives’ relative standing and 
what range of optimal integration level ensures acquisition success. 
We found that the second most important antecedent that influences both CEO and TMT 
turnover is pre-acquisition performance. Consistent with the theory of relative standing, our 
findings show that executives of poorly performing firms are more likely to be dismissed or to 
leave post-acquisition, perhaps because they are likely to experience lower status and confined 
discretion. Firm performance is perceived to reflect an executive’s capabilities, and even if he or 
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she is not immediately replaced post-acquisition, “the executive who stays will experience low 
status and various forms of disdain, which will lead eventually to voluntary or involuntary 
departure” (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993: 738). We also found that when executive turnover was 
measured using primary data, the estimated effect is stronger than when secondary data were 
used. This finding may indicate that secondary data such as annual reports and/or reference 
books are more likely to lack precise records or have missing data, which can result in smaller 
cumulative turnover rates. Future research should aim at reducing measurement error by using 
multiple sources such as official company disclosures, news articles, and company records, to 
verify the accuracy of turnover data. Similarly, we found that effect size estimates are stronger 
when perceptual performance measures were used rather than measures based on objective data. 
This is likely due to respondents’ retrospective accounts, which have been shown to reflect error 
or bias in recall of past events (Golden, 1992). Future research should rely on multiple methods 
of collecting pre-acquisition performance data or surveying multiple respondents. Another 
interesting finding suggests that the association between pre-acquisition performance and TMT 
turnover is much stronger for acquisitions occurring in the period between the mid-'70s to mid-
'90s. An explanation may center on the higher probability of hostile takeovers in this period; 
hostility of acquisitions also points to the importance of relative standing. 
Our bivariate results provide no evidence for the relations of relative firm size and only a 
negative marginal effect of acquisition experience with executive turnover. Nevertheless, the 
MASEM results show that acquisition experience significantly influences executive turnover 
when considered within a broader nomological network.  
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The Mediating Role of Executive Turnover 
We also sought to examine the role of executive turnover as a key mechanism through 
which antecedents influence post-acquisition performance. Our results offer insights into the 
interrelations among antecedents, executive turnover, and post-acquisition performance. 
Specifically, we found that three of the four antecedents influence post-acquisition performance 
through their effect on executive turnover. First, post-acquisition performance is affected by the 
performance of the acquired firm pre-acquisition because such firms tend to experience high 
levels of TMT turnover. Turnover of acquired firm executives may further disrupt internal and 
external organizational relations, (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993) introducing greater challenges to 
the acquirer in improving the acquired firm’s performance (Clark & Ofek, 1994).  
Second, we found that acquirer’s acquisition experience has a direct negative effect and 
an indirect positive effect on post-acquisition performance through TMT turnover. One plausible 
explanation for these findings is that acquiring firms with acquisition experience may have 
developed capabilities that allow them to assess the complementarity between the skill set of the 
TMTs of the acquired firm and their management team (Krishnan et al., 1997; Krug & Aguilera, 
2005). These capabilities may channel acquiring firms away from firms with top managers that 
possess non-complementary skills. Also, acquiring firms with acquisition experience are better 
positioned to recognize the value of retaining acquired firm executives to the integration process 
and the successful completion of the acquisition. Overall, a mindset that appreciates the value of 
retaining incumbent executives of acquired firms and a capacity to target firms with 
complementary managerial assets may help explain the indirect positive effect of acquisition 
experience on post-acquisition performance through TMT turnover. 
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Lastly, we found that executive turnover partially mediates the influence of level of 
integration and acquisition experience on post-acquisition performance. For instance, greater 
integration positively influences post-acquisition performance because it allows for the 
realization of synergies (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Pablo, 1994). However, integrating the 
acquired firm with the acquirer is also associated with higher CEO and TMT turnover. 
Interestingly, in the case of TMT turnover, we found evidence of inconsistent mediation. This 
type of mediation is present when the direct and indirect effects of an independent variable on a 
dependent variable are of opposite signs. Such mediation effect may be overlooked if the sum of 
the direct and indirect paths is zero (i.e., the effects cancel each other out resulting in a zero total 
effect), leading to the “erroneous conclusion that mediation was not present in this situation” 
(MacKinnon et al., 2000: 175). Our findings suggest that the direct effect of integration on post-
acquisition performance is positive, but its effect through TMT turnover is negative. As a result, 
the benefits of integration are lost when it results in loss of valuable human capital. This finding 
highlights that the relation between level of integration and post-acquisition performance is 
complex and in need of future research. On the contrary, our results suggest that CEO turnover 
may help firms transform the advantages of integration into superior post-acquisition 
performance levels. Accordingly, future examinations of the level of integration–post-acquisition 
performance relation should investigate the mediating roles of CEO and TMT turnover 
simultaneously by modeling them as two different types of executive turnover.  
Overall, the results of our mediation analysis show that not accounting for strategic 
changes in the management cadre of acquired firms after an acquisition may explain why prior 
research on determinants of post-acquisition performance has generated inconclusive findings. 
The examined antecedents have valuable implications for post-acquisition performance, and 
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executive turnover appears to have a central role in bridging these relations. Thus, future 
research should not rely on oversimplified models of post-acquisition performance. 
Limitations 
As with any meta-analysis, the variables included in the analysis are restricted to the ones 
examined in a sufficient number of primary studies and for which effect sizes could be extracted. 
Other important antecedents likely affect executives’ relative standing and turnover. Likewise, 
our results on the CEO–post-acquisition performance relation should be interpreted with caution 
because we could only extract two effect sizes for this relation. Similarly, due to missing effect 
sizes for the relation between CEO and TMT turnover, we were unable to simultaneously 
examine a comprehensive antecedents-turnover-performance model. Such analysis may provide 
new insights regarding the relative influence of CEO versus TMT rate of turnover on post-
acquisition performance. Due to issues of data availability, a majority of primary studies focus 
on large acquisitions by established public firms. As a result, the generalizability of the reported 
meta-analytic results is somewhat limited to this population of acquisitions. Future research is 
needed to determine whether the same processes can be observed in the context of acquisitions 
by smaller private acquirers. Furthermore, we were unable to determine whether the type of 
executive turnover (i.e., voluntary vs. involuntary) can explain variance in effect size estimates. 
Differentiating between voluntary and involuntary executive turnover is challenging, but such 
distinctions are likely to provide new insights into the circumstances when executives are more 
likely to voluntarily leave post-acquisition and when are they more likely to be replaced.  
We also cannot make causal inferences regarding the effects of antecedents on turnover 
and its influence on post-acquisition performance, nor can we confidently conclude that relative 
standing, the key proposed rationale underlying many of our arguments, is, in fact, the primary 
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mechanism driving executive post-acquisition turnover. Future research that assesses the relative 
standing of acquired executives post-acquisition in terms of self-perceptions, perceptions of 
acquiring firm executives, and objective measures would be valuable.  
Lastly, since data sources such as SDC Platinum, Thomson ONE, and Zephyr are often 
used in primary studies to select samples from the population of acquisitions, the issue of 
potentially overlapping samples inevitably arises. Unfortunately, researchers’ use of unique 
filters in selecting the sample of acquisitions for their studies makes it virtually impossible to 
determine whether there is overlap across samples in different publications. Dalton et al. (2003) 
note that similar issue arises when studies derived samples of firms from lists such as Fortune 
500, Standard & Poor’s 500, etc. Nevertheless, Dalton et al. also note it does not necessarily 
constitute a drawback, and “these studies amount to an extensive series of constructive 
replications” (2003: 21) as different researchers have examined a particular relation in diverse 
contexts, at various times, and using different measures (e.g., using primary vs. secondary data). 
CONCLUSION 
Our meta-analytic review of the literature shows that executive turnover is among the 
most significant factors affecting post-acquisition performance, and provide some support for the 
theory of relative standing (Frank, 1985) as an explanation of the high levels of turnover of 
executives following acquisitions of their firms. Furthermore, we find that executive turnover is 
a significant mechanism through which firm and deal characteristics affect firms’ post-
acquisition performance. We are hopeful that our study will stimulate future research, further 
enriching our understanding of this phenomenon and its implications to acquisition success.  
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Relationship k N  r ρ 95% CI 80% CR I
2 Q Q b
Executive Turnover




Mid '80s to mid '90s 5 699 −.18 −.22 [−.32, −.04] 16.67 
**




Acquirer firm 5 755 −.08 −.09 [−.19, .04] 13.44 
**
Acquired firm 2 140 −.30 −.37 [−.39, −.20] .81
Combined firm 4 411 −.21 −.26 [−.40, −.01] 17.90 
***
H1. CEO turnover 2 789 .10 .13 [.05, .16] [.10, .10] 23.24% 1.30
Firm characteristics
H2. Pre-acquisition performance 12 5,798 .01 .01 [−.07, .09] [−.19, .22] 89.83% 108.12 
***
Pre-Performance measure type 4.61
 *
Perceptual 4 499 .10 .12 [−.07, .27] 15.68 
**
Non-perceptual 8 5,299 .00 .00 [−.09, .09] 88.10 
***
Post-Performance measure type 29.12 
***
Perceptual 4 486 .24 .28 [.17, .32] 3.23




Acquirer firm 4 2,623 −.09 −.12 [−.15, −.04] 7.83 
*
Acquired firm 2 214 .31 .38 [.23, .38] .71
Combined firm 6 2,961 .08 .10 [−.02, .17] 40.26 
***
Sample period 5.53 
*
Mid '80s to mid '90s 4 573 .20 .25 [−.02, .42] 32.53 
***
Mid '90s to late '00s 4 365 .04 .05 [−.20, .29] 22.63 
***
H5. Acquisition experience 38 24,734 −.01 −.01 [−.03, .02] [−.14, .12] 78.54% 172.43 
*** 
Time of measurement 36.59 
***
< 2 years 24 20,128 − .03 −.04 [−.05, −.00] [−.13, .06] 82.71 
***
> 2 years 7 3,998 .08 .10 [.01, .15] [−.04, .24] 37.29 
***
Deal characteristics
H8. Level of integration 13 1,529 .10 .12 [.00, .19] [−.11, .35] 74.41% 46.89 
***
H11. Relative firm size 35 21,117 .06 .07 [.01, .11] [−.17, .32] 93.70% 539.33 
***
Relative firm size measure type 297.07
 ***
Assets 11 8,020 −.05 −.06 [−.07, − 02] [−.11, −.01] 19.21 
*
Employees 4 1,968 −.08 −.09 [−.14, −.01] [−.17, −.02] 8.38 
*
Market Value 7 9,019 .20 .25 [.09, .31] [.01, .48] 212.89 
***
Sales/Revenues 11 1,863 .01 .01 [−.03, .05] [.01, .01] 8.15
† 
p  < .10
*
 p  < .05
**
 p  < .01
***
 p  < .001 
TABLE 1
Factors Influencing Post-Acquisition Performance: Main and Moderating Effect Results
Note: k  represents the number of studies. N  represents the numbers of acquisitions. r  is the mean sample-size corrected effect size, and ρ  is 
the mean sample-size-weighted corrected effect size due to unreliability attenuation. 95% CI is the 95% confidence interval around the mean 
sample-size-weighted corrected (ρ ) effect size and 80% CR  represents the 80% credibility interval. I 2  denotes the percentage of variance 
across studies due to heterogeneity, with larger value of I
2
 indicating more heterogeneity. Q is the chi-square test for homogeneity of corrected 
effect sizes ρ  across studies, and Q b  represents the between-group test of homogeneity; a significant value indicates that moderator explains 
variability of effect sizes.





Relationship k N  r ρ 95% CI 80% CR I
2 Q Q b
Top Management Team Turnover
Firm characteristics
H3. Pre-acquisition performance 9 922 −.20 −.24 [−.30, −.10] [−.35, −.10] 64.04% 22.25 
**
Turnover data source 9.68 
**
Primary 5 539 −.30 −.36 [−.40, −.20] 8.30 
†
Secondary 3 254 −.06 −.08 [−.13, .01] .85
Performance measure type 10.89 
***
Perceptual 4 493 −.30 −.37 [−.42, −.18] 8.31 
*
Non-perceptual 5 429 −.09 −.10 [−.15, −.01] 2.92
Sample period 4.83 
*
Mid '70s to mid '90s 3 332 −.24 −.30 [−.36, −.12] 4.26
Mid '90s to late '00s 4   −.06 −.07 [−.10, −.01] .85
H6. Acquisition experience 8 902 −.03 −.04 [−.12, .07] [−.20, .11] 57.47% 16.46 
* 
Deal characteristics
H9. Level of integration 6 620 .28 .33 [.09, .48] [.00, .57] 87.98% 41.61 
***
H12. Relative firm size 9 1,070 −.01 −.01 [−.07, .05] [−.01, −.01] 7.53% 8.65
CEO Turnover
Firm characteristics
H3. Pre-acquisition performance 9 3,419 −.08 −.09 [−.13, −.02] [−.15, .00] 61.37% 20.71
 **
Performance measure type 4.65 
*
Accounting 4 2,693 −.06 −.07 [−.10, −.01] 48.53% 5.83
Market 5 726 −.15 −.18 [−.25, −.04] 61.72% 10.45 
*
H6. Acquisition experience 3 709 −.04 −.05 [−.08, .00] [−.04, −.04] .00% .88
Deal characteristics
H9. Level of integration 2 583 .26 .32 [.14, .38] [.17, .35] 80.90% 5.24 
*
H12. Relative firm size 3 703 −.01 −.02 [−.10, .07] [−.05, .03] 46.03% 3.71
† 
p  < .10
*
 p  < .05
**
 p  < .01
***
 p  < .001 
TABLE 2
Factors Influencing Executive Turnover Following Acquisitions: Main and Moderating Effect Results
Note: k  represents the number of studies. N  represents the numbers of acquisitions. r  is the mean sample-size corrected effect size, and ρ 
is the mean sample-size-weighted corrected effect size due to unreliability attenuation. 95% CI is the 95% confidence interval around the 
mean sample-size-weighted corrected (ρ ) effect size and 80% CR  represents the 80% credibility interval. I 2  denotes the percentage of 
variance across studies due to heterogeneity, with larger value of I
2
 indicating more heterogeneity. Q is the chi-square test for homogeneity 
of corrected effect sizes ρ  across studies, and Q b  represents the between-group test of homogeneity; a significant value indicates that 
moderator explains variability of effect sizes.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. CEO Turnover 0.80
2. TMT Turnover 0.82
3. Acquisition Experience 0.81
r (ρ) −.04 (−.05) −.03 (−.04)
CI 95 −.08: .00 −.12: .07
CR 80 −.05: −.05 −.20: .11
k (N ) 3 (709) 8 (902)
4. Pre-Acquisition Performance 0.81
r (ρ) −.08 (−.09) −.20 (−.24)  .05 (.06)
CI 95 −.13: −.02 −.30: −.10 −.01: .10
CR 80 −.19: .00 −.41: −.07 −.06: .17
k (N ) 9 (3,419) 9 (922) 11 (5,393)
5. Industry Relatedness 0.79
r (ρ) −.03 (−.04) .07 (.08)  −.03 (−.04) −.03 (−.04)
CI 95 −.09: .03 −.03: .16 −.06: .00 −.07: .01
CR 80 −.13: .05 −.13: .30 −.16: .09 −.13: .06
k (N ) 6 (3,270) 12 (1,296) 38 (23,035) 15 (7,200)
6. Relative Firm Size 0.80
r (ρ)  −.01 (−.02)  −.01 (−.00) −.08 (−.11) −.03 (−.03) .01 (.01)
CI 95 −.10: .07 −.07: .05 −.11: −.05 −.06: .01 −.03: .05
CR 80 −.07: .03 −.01: −.01 −.25: .03 −.03: −.03 −.12: .14
k (N ) 4 (1,075) 9 (1,070) 25 (16,939) 12 (3,486) 26 (10,499)
7. Level of Integration 0.82
r (ρ) .26 (.32) .28 (.33) .11 (.14) −.14 (−.18) .18 (.23) −.07 (−.08)
CI 95 .14: .38  .09: .48 .06: .16 −.23: −.06 .06: .30 −.12: −.02
CR 80 .21: .44 −.01: .66 .09: .18 −.21: −.14 −.13: .59 −.13: −.03
k (N ) 3 (955) 6 (620) 11 (1,793) 5 (593) 16 (2,243) 13 (1,863)
8. Post-Acquisition Performance 0.82
r (ρ) .10 (.13) −.14 (−.17) −.01 (−.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.02) .06 (.07) .10 (.12)
CI 95 .05: .16 −.24: −.04 − 04: .02 −.07: .09 −.01: .04 .01: .11 .00: .19
CR 80 .13: .13 −.40: .04 −.14: .12 −.19: .22 −.09: .13 −.17: .32 −.11: .35
k (N ) 2 (789) 11 (1,306) 38 (24,734) 12 (5,798) 49 (20,430) 35 (21,117) 13 (1,529)
Note:  Italicized numbers on the main diagonal are reliability coefficients. ρ  is the mean true score (corrected) correlation; r  is the observed correlation; CI 95: 95 percent 
confidence interval for ρ ; CR80: 80 percent credibility interval for ρ ; k: number of studies used in computing ρ ; N  is the sample size used in computing ρ . 
Harmonic mean (TMT) = 1,862; Harmonic mean (CEO) = 1,840.
TABLE 3
Meta-Analytic Correlations and Descriptive Statistics
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TO → POST  −.25 ***  −.25 ***  −.24 ***  −.17 *** .10 *** .10 *** .10 *** .13 ***
PRE → POST  −.01  −.01 .04 † .04 † .04 †
EXP → POST  −.04 †  −.04 †  −.04 †  −.01  −.01
INT → POST .22 *** .22 *** .21 *** .11 *** .11 *** .10 ***
SIZ → POST .09 *** .09 *** .09 *** .08 *** .08 *** .09 ***
REL → POST  −.01  −.01  −.00  −.00
PRE → TO  −.19 ***  −.19 ***  −.19 ***  −.03  −.03
EXP → TO  −.07 **  −.07 **  −.07 **  −.10 ***  −.11 ***  −.10 ***
INT → TO .30 *** .30 *** .30 *** .36 *** .37 *** .36 ***
SIZ → TO .00  −.00 .00 .00






2 .48 87.82 *** 1.90 29.79 ***
df
RMSEA .00 .11 .00 .05
SRMR .00 .04 .01 .02
NFI .99 .80 .99 .91
CFI 1.00 .81 1.00 .92
Total effects
PRE on POST .04 † .05 *** .03 *** .04 † .04 †  −.00
EXP on POST  −.02  −.02 ** .01 ** .03 .03 .01 ***
INT on POST .14 *** .14 ***  −.05 *** .14 *** .14 *** .05 ***
Indirect effects
PRE on POST .05 *** .05 *** .03 ***  −.00  −.00
EXP on POST .02 ** .02 ** .01 **  −.01 **  −.01 ** .01 ***
INT on POST  −.07 ***  −.07 ***  −.05 *** .04 *** .04 *** .05 ***
† p  < .10,  *  p  < .05, **  p  < .01, *** p  < .001
a Best fitting model based on χ2 difference tests and fit statistics.
Note:
 
N  = 1,862 acquisitions for Top Management Team, and N  = 1,840 for CEO (on the basis of harmonic mean). TO = executive turnover; EXP = prior acquisition experience; PRE = pre-
acquisition performance; SIZ = relative firm size; INT = level of integration; POST = post-acquisition performance; REL = industry relatedness (as a control variable). 
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A. TMT Turnover Alternative Mediation Model
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Structural Equation Modeling Results
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Harmonic Mean (N ) 1464
TO → POST (k ) 4
TO → POST  −.24 ***  −.18 ***  −.32 ***  −.34 ***  −.29 *** .10 *** .10 ***
PRE → POST  −.12 *** .06 * .07 ** .25 *** .04 † .03
EXP → POST  −.04 †  −.05 † .03 .03  −.03
INT → POST .21 *** .18 *** .24 *** .25 *** .25 *** .10 *** .11 ***
SIZ → POST .09 *** .09 *** .09 *** .09 ***
REL → POST  −.07 **  −.05 * .06 *
PRE → TO  −.19 ***  −.19 **  −.19 ***  −.19 ***  −.19 ***
EXP → TO  −.07 **  −.07 **  −.07 **  −.07 **  −.07 *  −.11 ***  −.11 ***
INT → TO .30 *** .30 *** .30 *** .30 *** .30 *** .37 *** .37 ***
SIZ → TO .00







.48 .05 .12 .04 .03 1.90 1.88
df 4 3 3 3 3 4 3
RMSEA .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
SRMR .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .01
NFI .99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .99 .99
CFI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total effects
PRE on POST .05 ***  −.09 ** .12 *** .14 *** .30 *** .04 † .03
EXP on POST  −.02 **  −.03 .06 * .05 *  − .01 .03 .01 ***
INT on POST .14 *** .12 *** .15 *** .15 *** .16 *** .14 *** .15 ***
Indirect effects
PRE on POST .05 *** .03 *** .06 *** .06 *** .05 ***
EXP on POST .02 ** .01 ** .02 ** .02 ** .02 *  −.01 **  −.01 **
INT on POST  −.07 ***  −.06 ***  −.10 ***  −.10 ***  −.09 *** .04 *** .04 ***
† p  < .10
 *
 p  < .05
** 
p  < .01
*** 
































7.50% 6.30% 12.10% 14.00%










Meta-Analytic Structural Equation Models












TO = Turnover; EXP = prior acquisition experience; PRE = pre-acquisition performance; SIZ = relative firm size; INT = level of 
integration; POST = post-acquisition performance; REL = industry relatedness (as a control variable). 
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Description of Constructs 





Proportion of top 
executives present at 
the time of the 
acquisition, who had 
departed post-
acquisition (Cannella 
& Hambrick, 1993) 
Cumulative TMT departure rates: Number of 
executives who had departed the acquired firm 
post-acquisition divided by the number of 
executives employed before the acquisition (e.g., 
Lubatkin et al., 1999)  
Extent of change in the executive leadership of the 





Whether the acquired 
firm CEO has departed 
post-acquisition 
Whether the acquired firm’s CEO has departed post-
acquisition (e.g., Dullard & Hawtrey, 2012)  
Relative 
firm size 
The size of the 
acquired firm relative 
to the acquiring firm 
(Ellis, Reus, Lamont, 
& Ranft, 2011; Zollo 
& Singh, 2004)  
Ratio acquired firm’s to acquiring firm's assets (e.g., 
Zollo & Singh, 2004)  
Ratio of acquired firm's sales to acquiring firm's sales 
(e.g., Heimeriks, Schijven, & Gates, 2012)  
Ratio of acquired firm's revenues to acquiring firm's 
revenues (e.g., Marsh, 2005)  
Ratio of the number of acquired firm’s employees to 
the number of acquiring firm's employees (e.g., 
Schijven & Hitt, 2012)   
Ratio of the acquired firm's market capitalization to 
the sum of the acquired and acquiring firm's 






The stock of 
accumulated 
knowledge specific to 
managing the 
acquisition process 
(Singh & Zollo, 1998)  
 
Total number of prior acquisitions (e.g., Ellis et al., 
2011)  
Degree of experience prior to the acquisition (e.g., 








construct that refers to 
the extent to which 
financial objectives of 
the acquired firm are 
met pre-acquisition 
 
Accounting-based: e.g., ROAa, ROEb (e.g., Hambrick 
& Cannella, 1993)  
Market-based: e.g., CARc (e.g., Dullard & Hawtrey, 
2012)  
Perceptual: perceived performance (e.g., Heimeriks 
et al., 2012)  
Growth: e.g., employment growth in the acquired 
firm (e.g., Krug & Nigh, 1998)  






Degree of discretion 
granted to acquired 
firm’s management 
with respect to strategy, 
systems, and 
procedures (Lubatkin et 
al., 1999)  
Extent to which the separate functions and activities 
of the acquiring and the acquired firms were 
physically consolidated into one (e.g., Heimeriks 
et al., 2012)  
Extent of alignment and centralization of systems, 
procedures, employees, and products (e.g., Zollo 
& Singh, 2004) 
Level of autonomy granted to the acquired firm (e.g., 







construct that refers to 
the extent to which 
financial objectives are 
met post-acquisition  
 
Accounting-based: ROAa (e.g., Bergh, 2001)  
Market-based: CARc (e.g., Cording et al., 2008)  






The extent of similarity 
between acquired and 
acquiring firms with 
respect to processes 
and product offerings, 
(Ellis et al., 2011)  
 
Extent to which an acquiring firm’s primary SIC 
codes are related to the acquired firm’s primary SIC 
codes (e.g., Bergh, 2001)  
Classification based on Federal Trade Commission’s 
five-fold category system (e.g., Walsh, 1989)  
Perceived relatedness/strategic fit between acquired 
and acquiring firms (e.g., Saxton & Dollinger, 
2004) 
aROA = return on assets; bROE = return on equity; cCAR = cumulative abnormal returns 
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Sources of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis 
 
Study Type Number of studies 
Journals  
Academy of Management Journal 9 
Accounting Review 1 
Administrative Science Quarterly 1 
Applied Financial Economies 1 
Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 1 
Corporate Governance-an International Review 1 
European Financial Management 1 
European Journal of International Management 1 
Global Journal of Business Research 1 
Human Relations 2 
Information Systems Research 1 
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 1 
International Studies of Management & Organization 2 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 1 
Journal of Banking & Finance 1 
Journal of Business Research 1 
Journal of Economic and Social Studies 1 
Journal of Finance 3 
Journal of Financial Research 1 
Journal of International Business Studies 2 
Journal of International Management 2 
Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies 1 
Journal of Management 7 
Journal of Management Studies 1 
Journal of Marketing 1 
Journal of Marketing Research 1 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management 1 
Journal of World Business 6 
Management Decision 1 
Management International Review 1 
Management Science 1 
Organization Science 5 
Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets & Policies 1 
Service Industries Journal 1 
Strategic Management Journal 35 
The Journal of High Technology Management Research 1 
Book Chapters 3 
Conference papers 2 
Working papers 6 
Dissertations 3 
EXECUTIVE TURNOVER META-ANALYSIS - SUPPLEMENTAL 
 DS5 

































A. Correlated predictor model
EXECUTIVE TURNOVER META-ANALYSIS - SUPPLEMENTAL 
 DS6 
Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis 
 
Aghasi, K., Colombo, M., Rossi-Lamastra, C., & Zrilic, O. 2012. Acquisition implementation 
strategies: Structural integration and acquired CEO retention as sequential events. 
Presented at the DRUID Academy Conference. 
Ahammad, M. F., & Glaister, K. W. 2011. Postacquisition management and performance of 
cross-border acquisitions. International Studies of Management & Organization, 41(3): 59–
75. 
Ahammad, M. F., Glaister, K. W., Weber, Y., & Tarba, S. Y. 2012a. Determinants of top 
management retention in cross border acquisitions. In Y. Weber (Ed.), Handbook of 
Research on Mergers and Acquisitions (pp. 259–283). Northampton, MA, US: Edward 
Elgar Publishing. 
Ahammad, M. F., Glaister, K. W., Weber, Y., & Tarba, S. Y. 2012b. Top management retention 
in cross-border acquisitions: The roles of financial incentives, acquirer’s commitment and 
autonomy. European Journal of International Management, 6(4): 458–480. 
Bauer, F., & Matzler, K. 2014. Antecedents of M&A success: The role of strategic 
complementarity, cultural fit, and degree and speed of integration. Strategic Management 
Journal, 35(2): 269–291. 
Beitel, P., Schiereck, D., & Wahrenburg, M. 2004. Explaining M&A success in European banks. 
European Financial Management, 10(1): 109–139. 
Bens, D. A., Goodman, T. H., & Neamtiu, M. 2012. Does investment-related pressure lead to 
misreporting? An analysis of reporting following M&A transactions. Accounting Review, 
87(3): 839–865. 
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Benson, D., & Ziedonis, R. H. 2009. Corporate venture capital as a window on new technologies: 
Implications for the performance of corporate investors when acquiring startups. 
Organization Science, 20(2): 329–351. 
Bergh, D. D. 2001. Executive retention and acquisition outcomes: A test of opposing views on 
the influence of organizational tenure. Journal of Management, 27(5): 603–622. 
Bhabra, H. S., & Huang, J. 2013. An empirical investigation of mergers and acquisitions by 
Chinese listed companies, 1997–2007. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 
23(3): 186–207. 
Bruton, G. D., Oviatt, B. M., & White, M. A. 1994. Performance of acquisitions of distressed 
firms. Academy of Management Journal, 37(4): 972–989. 
Buchholtz, A. K., Ribbens, B. A., & Houle, I. T. 2003. The role of human capital in 
postacquisition CEO departure. Academy of Management Journal, 46(4): 506–514. 
Cannella, A. A., & Hambrick, D. C. 1993. Effects of executive departures on the performance of 
acquired firms. Strategic Management Journal, 14(S1): 137–152. 
Capron, L., & Guillén, M. 2009. National corporate governance institutions and post-acquisition 
target reorganization. Strategic Management Journal, 30(8): 803–833. 
Capron, L., & Pistre, N. 2002. When do acquirers earn abnormal returns? Strategic Management 
Journal, 23(9): 781–794. 
Carow, K., Heron, R., & Saxton, T. 2004. Do early birds get the returns? An empirical 
investigation of early-mover advantages in acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal, 
25(6): 563–585. 
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Chakrabarti, A., & Mitchell, W. 2015. The role of geographic distance in completing related 
acquisitions: Evidence from US chemical manufacturers. Strategic Management Journal, 
(Advance online publication). 
* Cording, M., Christmann, P., & King, D. R. 2008. Reducing causal ambiguity in acquisition 
integration: Intermediate goals as mediators of integration decisions and acquisition 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 51(4): 744–767. 
Datta, D. K. 1991. Organizational fit and acquisition performance: Effects of post-acquisition 
integration. Strategic Management Journal, 12(4): 281–297. 
Datta, D. K., & Grant, J. H. 1990. Relationship between type of acquisition, the autonomy given 
to the acquired firm, and acquisition success: An empirical analysis. Journal of 
Management, 16(1): 29–44. 
Davis, R., & Nair, A. 2003. A note on top management turnover in international acquisitions. 
Management International Review, 43(2): 171–183. 
Dikova, D., & Rao Sahib, P. 2013. Is cultural distance a bane or a boon for cross-border 
acquisition performance? Journal of World Business, 48(1): 77–86. 
* Dullard, S., & Hawtrey, K. 2012. Disciplinary corporate takeovers: evidence from Australia. 
Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets & Policies, 15(3): 1250018–1–1250018–22. 
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